Painted portrait of George Washington, incomplete with areas of empty canvas except for face
George Washington (The Archives Portrait) / Gilbert Stuart / Oil on canvas, 1796 / National Portrait Gallery, Smithsonian Institution; acquired as a souvenir to the nation through the generosity of the Donald W. Reynolds Foundation

The army is a dangerous musical instrument to play with.
—George Washington

On a raw and windy twenty-four hours in March, American army officers met to program a mutiny. This was not a Tom Clancy or Brad Thor thriller; information technology actually happened. On March 15, 1783, an officers' meeting was held in Newburgh, New York, as George Washington'due south ground forces awaited the completion of peace negotiations in Paris that would end the American Revolution and allow the soldiers to disband. The army had not been paid in months. Officers used blankets to hide their tattered uniforms; soldiers did not even have blankets; at that place was little food. The regular army, including its commander, believed that an ungrateful Congress had forgotten them.

Previous to the meeting of the army officers, an anonymous "Address" was circulated, demanding relief from Congress earlier the army would disband. Ominously alluding to Washington, it warned officers to "suspect the man who would advise moderation." Even during the darkest days of the Revolution, Washington had deferred to Congress, never wavering on the principle of noncombatant dominance over the armed forces. He would not at present.

Painted portrait of Horatio Gates
Horatio Gates / James Peale, Copy after: Charles Willson Peale / Oil on sheet / National Portrait Gallery, Smithsonian Institution; fractional gift of Mr. Lawrence A. Fleischman

The plot originated with politicians frustrated with the weak authorities under the Articles of Confederation and with several ground forces officers, including General Horatio Gates, the "hero of Saratoga," who sought to replace Washington as commander-in-chief. Congressmen Alexander Hamilton and James Wilson, Gouverneur Morris, and Superintendent of Finance Robert Morris schemed to have the army mutiny, intimidating Congress into passing an import tax that would provide resources to pay the soldiers and supply the government with permanent revenue. These men did non want a military coup, which they believed would issue in ceremonious war or chaos, but a stronger national government. Plotting with Gates, nevertheless, was a dangerous game, since he did want a coup. Non unaware of the danger, the politicians depended on GeneralWashington to keep the army "within the bounds of moderation."

Tension was loftier equally Gates opened the proceedings on the forenoon of March xv. Washington was not expected to nourish but entered the meeting hall through a side door and asked for permission to speak; Gates could not refuse. Instead of pleading for moderation, Washington attacked the Accost as "destructive of all order and discipline." He reminded the officers of his loyalty to them and declared that rebellion would lead to "the ruin" of both the ground forces and regime. He pledged himself to their cause. Then, the unexpected happened. Attempting to read a alphabetic character from a congressman supporting the army, Washington became disoriented, and reached into his pocket for a pair of spectacles. Excusing himself, he explained that not only had he grown grey in serving his country, but now establish himself growing bullheaded. The officers were stunned. Their frustrations and anger dissolved earlier their commander's admission of frailty. Some officers openly wept. Washington brought them dorsum from the abyss.

The army received relief from Congress, but the politicians did not become their tax. Some may minimize an event that did non happen, but contemporaries realized its seriousness. A mutiny might have weakened the position of those seeking a stronger national authorities and would accept delayed the formation of a national military institution. Thomas Jefferson later best expressed the significance of Washington'southward office in the new and fragile republic: "that the moderation and virtue of a single character had probably prevented this revolution from being closed as nearly others have been by a subversion of that liberty it was intended to establish."

The all-time account of the "Newburgh conspiracy" is Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword: The Beginnings of the Military Institution in America. (New York, 1975).

—Sidney Hart, Historian Emeritus